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ABSTRACT
Since security has been a growing concern in recent years, the field of biomet-
rics has gained popularity and became an active research area. Beside new identity
authentication and recognition methods, protection against theft of biometric data
and potential privacy loss are current directions in biometric systems research.
Biometric traits which are used for verification can be grouped into two: phys-
ical and behavioral traits. Physical traits such as fingerprints and iris patterns are
characteristics that do not undergo major changes over time. On the other hand,
behavioral traits such as voice, signature, and gait are more variable; they are there-
fore more suitable to lower security applications. Behavioral traits such as voice and
signature also have the advantage of being able to generate numerous different bio-
metric templates of the same modality (e.g. different pass-phrases or signatures),
in order to provide cancelability of the biometric template and to prevent cross-
matching of different databases.
In this thesis, we present three new biometric verification systems based mainly
on voice modality. First, we propose a text-dependent (TD) system where acoustic
features are extracted from individual frames of the utterances, after they are aligned
via phonetic HMMs. Data from 163 speakers from the TIDIGITS database are
employed for this work and the best equal error rate (EER) is reported as 0.49% for
6-digit user passwords.
Second, a text-independent (TI) speaker verification method is implemented
inspired by the feature extraction method utilized for our text-dependent system.
Our proposed TI system depends on creating speaker specific phoneme codebooks.
Once phoneme codebooks are created on the enrollment stage using HMM alignment
and segmentation to extract discriminative user information, test utterances are
verified by calculating the total dissimilarity/distance to the claimed codebook. For
benchmarking, a GMM-based TI system is implemented as a baseline. The results
of the proposed TD system (0.22% EER for 7-digit passwords) is superior compared
to the GMM-based system (0.31% EER for 7-digit sequences) whereas the proposed
TI system yields worse results (5.79% EER for 7-digit sequences) using the data of
163 people from the TIDIGITS database .
Finally, we introduce a new implementation of the multi-biometric template
framework of Yanikoglu and Kholmatov [12], using fingerprint and voice modalities.
In this framework, two biometric data are fused at the template level to create a
multi-biometric template, in order to increase template security and privacy. The
current work aims to also provide cancelability by exploiting the behavioral aspect
of the voice modality.
xi
O¨ZET
Gu¨venlik konusu gu¨nu¨mu¨zde giderek artan bir endis¸e oldug˘undan biyometrik
aras¸tırmalar daha da o¨nem kazanmıs¸tır. Biyometrik konusundaki gu¨ncel c¸alıs¸malar
yeni kimlik dog˘rulama tekniklerinin yanı sıra, biyometrik verilerin hırsızlıg˘ına ve
bu verilerden veya verilerin tutuldug˘u veritabanlarından kis¸isel bilgilerin ortaya
c¸ıkarılmasına kars¸ı o¨nlemler u¨zerine yog˘unlas¸mıs¸tır.
Kimlik tanımlama ic¸in kullanılan biyometrik o¨zellikler iki gruba ayrılabilir:
fiziksel ve davranıs¸sal o¨zellikler. Parmakizi ve iris o¨ru¨ntu¨leri gibi fiziksel o¨zellikler
zaman ic¸erisinde c¸ok fazla deg˘is¸meyen o¨zelliklerdir. O¨te yandan ses, imza, yu¨ru¨yu¨s¸
gibi davranıs¸sal o¨zellikler daha deg˘is¸ken bir yapıda olup as¸ırı gu¨venlik gerektirmeyen
sistemler ic¸in daha uygundurlar. Ses ve imza gibi davranıs¸sal o¨zellikler dig˘er biy-
ometrik o¨zelliklere nazaran so¨ylenilen kelimenin ya da atılan imzanın deg˘is¸mesi ile
aynı o¨zellig˘i kullanarak farklı s¸ablonlar olus¸turabilme avantajına sahiptirler. Farklı
uygulamalarda farklı s¸ablonlar kullanılması, veritabanların kars¸ılas¸tırılarak kullanıcı
hakkında bilgi c¸ıkarılmasını o¨nleyebilecek o¨nemli bir etkendir.
Bu tez kapsamında, ses kullanarak u¨c¸ farklı biyometrik sistem sunulmus¸tur.
I˙lk olarak fonem bazlı Saklı Markov Modeller (SSM) yardımıyla hizalanmıs¸ is¸itsel
parolalardan akustik o¨znitelikler c¸ıkarılarak metin bag˘ımlı bir sistem o¨nerilmis¸tir.
TIDIGITS veritabanına ait 163 kis¸inin 6 haneli is¸itsel parolaları kullanılmıs¸ ve en
iyi Es¸it Hata Oranı (EHO) %0.49 olarak hesaplanmıs¸tır.
I˙kinci olarak, bir o¨nceki bo¨lu¨mde anlatılan o¨znitelik c¸ıkarma yo¨nteminden esin-
lenerek tasarlanmıs¸ bir metin bag˘ımsız konus¸macı tanıma sistemi gerc¸eklenmis¸tir.
O¨nerilen bu metin bag˘ımsız sistem konus¸macı fonem c¸izelgelerinden faydalanmak-
tadır. Eg˘itim ic¸in kullanılan is¸itsel parolaların fonem bazlı SMM yardımıyla hiza-
lanıp konus¸macılar arasındaki farkı en fazla go¨zetebilecek o¨zniteliklerin c¸ıkarılması
ile her konus¸macı ic¸in fonem c¸izelgeleri hazırlanmıs¸tır. Sınama as¸amasında ise
sınanacak is¸itsel parola ile iddia edilen kis¸inin fonem c¸izelgesi arasındaki toplam
uzaklıg˘a bakılmaktadır. Kars¸ılas¸tırma ic¸in Karma-Gaus-Modelleri (KGM) kullanan
bir metin bag˘ımsız konus¸macı tanıma sistemi gerc¸eklenmis¸tir. O¨nerilen metin bag˘ımlı
sistemin sonuc¸ları (7 haneli is¸itsel parolalar ic¸in %0.22 EHO) KGM tabanlı sisteme
(7 haneli is¸itsel parolalar ic¸in %0.31 EHO) go¨re daha iyidir. O¨te yandan TIDIGITS
veritabanına ait 163 konus¸macının bilgileriyle olus¸turulup o¨nerilen metin bag˘ımsız
sistem (7 haneli is¸itsel parolalar ic¸in %5.79 EHO) kars¸ılas¸tırılan dig˘er iki sisteme
go¨re ko¨tu¨ performans sergilemis¸tir.
Son olarak Yanıkog˘lu ve Kholmatov [12] tarafından o¨nerilen c¸oklu biyometrik
s¸ablon c¸erc¸evesine ses ve parmakizi kullanarak yeni bir o¨rnek sunulmus¸tur. Bu
c¸erc¸evede iki biyometrik veri s¸ablon seviyesinde birles¸tirilerek s¸ablon gu¨venlig˘i ve
mahremiyetinin artırılması amac¸lanır. Bu c¸alıs¸mada davranıs¸sal bir biyometrik olan
ses verilerinin kullanılması ile, var olan c¸erc¸eveye s¸ablonun iptal edilebilmesi o¨zellig˘i
eklenmis¸tir.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Due to increasing security concerns, person identification and verification have
gained significance over the last years. Identification or verification of a claimed
identity can be based on 3 major themes: “what you have”, “what you know” or
“who you are”. Historically, the first two themes have been the main methods of
authentication. Electronic identification cards are also commonly used as tokens in
entering secure areas. Similarly, a credit card and its pin number form a simple
example of the fusion of the two themes. Systems that are based on the theme
of “who you are” are classified as biometric systems. Biometric systems utilizes
pre-recorded physical (e.g. iris, fingerprint and hand shape) or behavioral (e.g.
signature, voice and gait) traits of a person for later authentication.
The main characteristics distinguishing different biometric modalities include
universality (whether everyone has that trait); measurability (whether that biomet-
ric can be easily measured); stability (whether the trait changes significantly over
time); forgeability (whether someone else can easily forge your biometric trait); and
whether the biometric can be changed at will (whether the person can change his
own trait to hide his identity). In these regards, physical traits stand out as they
are quite universal, mostly stable, hard to forge and changeable at will. Some other
physiological biometrics and most behavioral biometrics are more varying, either
due to ageing or other reasons such as stress. However they may be better suited
for a particular security application (e.g. online banking over the phone).
A major concern with the use of biometric technologies is the fear that they
can be used to track people if biometric databases are misused. A related concern
is that once compromised, a physiological biometric (e.g. fingerprint) cannot be
canceled (one cannot get a new fingerprint). The privacy and cancelability concerns
lead researches to find new solutions, often combining cryptography and biometrics
in recent years [35, 2, 18, 12].
In this thesis, we present biometric authentication systems based mainly on
voice modality. Voice has certain advantages over other biometrics, in particular
acceptability of its use for identity authentication, as well as its suitability for certain
tasks such as telephone banking. A further advantage of voice is that it provides a
cancelable biometric within text-dependent speaker verification systems.
In voice verification systems, different levels of information can be extracted
from a speech sample of a user. As summarized by Day and Nandi [41], lexical and
syntactic features of voice such as language and sentence construction are at the
highest level. These features are highly dependent on the spoken text, however very
costly computationally. In order to extract high level features, automatic speech
recognition tools need to be utilized first. After extracting the words uttered in
a given speech sample, lexical or syntactic analysis can be done as described by
Day and Nandi [41]. This means, in order to extract high-level features, additional
calculations are needed after lower level features are extracted first. At the lower
levels, there are prosodic features like intonation, stress and rhythm of speech. These
features also depend on the spoken text, but also on how the text is uttered. Next,
there are the phonetic features based on the sound of the syllables which also vary
according to the uttered text. Lastly, low level acoustic features can be extracted
to acquire information about the generation of the voice by the speaker and these
are considered to be text independent [41].
Verification systems based on voice are divided into two main groups: text-
dependent (TD) and text-independent (TI) systems. During enrollment to a text-
dependent system, the speaker is asked to repeat a fixed text which is considered
to be his/her password. Then, a user specific template or model is constructed
from the collected reference samples of the spoken password. In authentication, the
utterance is compared with the template of the claimed identity. If the similarity
is above a certain predefined threshold, the utterance is accepted and the user is
verified. In text-independent systems, mostly low levels of information from spectral
analysis is used for identification or verification since higher levels of features are
mainly dependent on the text. Thus, TI systems require longer training sessions and
varying voice samples to include all sounds for all possible voice combinations to
create statistical speaker models whereas a fewer repetitions of the spoken password
are enough to create a template or a model in TD systems. For a TI system,
the statistical speaker models are created from the phonemes extracted from the
collected data. Then, during the testing phase, a voice sample is compared with
the text-independent user-specific model and the speaker is verified according to the
similarity scores.
An important factor which determines the success of a voice verification sys-
tem is the duration and the scope of the training and testing sessions. As mentioned
above, longer training sessions by using numerous utterances results in better de-
scription of the templates in TD systems or speaker models in TI systems. Similarly,
longer test utterances provide better verification performance for both TI and TD
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systems: the longer the utterance, the more information can be extracted from the
voice sample.
While comparing speaker identification or verification systems the database
size is also an important factor to evaluate the reliability of the system. Larger
databases provide more confidence in the reported results. Therefore, when com-
paring performances of different systems, one should consider the size of the database
used in order to have a fair opinion on the performances of the compared systems.
Generally, public databases such as TIDIGITS, YOHO or NIST are used for bench-
marking different algorithms in speaker identification or verification.
Beside speaker verification systems (text-dependent in Chapter 3 and text-
independent in Chapter 4), we present an implementation of a multi-biometric
framework that combines voice and fingerprint, in Chapter 5. Combinations of
biometric traits are preferred due the following reasons: their lower error rates, in-
creased privacy and cancelability if one of the biometrics is a behavioral trait like
voice. Using multiple biometric modalities has been shown to decrease error rates
by providing additional useful information to the classifier. Fusion of any behavioral
or physiological traits can occur in various levels. Different features can be used by a
single system at the feature, template or decision level [9]. For this work, voice and
fingerprint, are fused at the template level and both biometric features are combined
to be used by a single verifier. The second gain obtained by combining multiple bio-
metrics at the template level is privacy. In summary, privacy is increased since the
combined template do not reveal individual biometrics. Finally, changing spoken
password in a text-dependent speaker verification scenario adds cancelability to the
combined biometric template.
The remainder of the thesis is as follows. After an introduction to Hidden
Markov Models in Chapter 2, we present a new method for text-dependent speaker
verification through extraction of fixed-length feature vectors from utterances, in
Chapter 3. The system is faster and uses less memory as compared to the con-
ventional HMM-based approach, while having state-the-art results. In our system,
we only use a single set of speaker-independent monophone HMM models. This
set is used for alignment, whereas for the conventional HMM-based approach, an
adapted HMM set for each speaker is constructed in addition to a speaker inde-
pendent HMM set (also called universal background model in that context). This
requires much higher amount of memory as compared to the proposed approach.
In addition, during testing only a single HMM alignment is required as compared
to two HMM alignments using a universal background model and a speaker model
for the conventional approach. Thus, verification is also faster with the approach
introduced in this thesis.
In Chapter 4, we propose a text-independent speaker verification system using
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phoneme codebooks. These codebooks are generated by aligning the enrollment
utterances using phonetic HMMs and creating MFCC-based fixed-length feature
vectors to represent each phoneme. Through creating phoneme codebooks, we tried
to extract discriminative speaker information at the phoneme level. However the
results of this chapter is not in par with state-the-art TI verification results.
In Chapter 5, we introduce a new implementation of the multi-biometric
template framework of Yanikoglu and Kholmatov [12], using fingerprint and voice
modalities. In this framework, two biometric data are fused at the template level
to create a combined, multi-biometric template, in order to increase both security
and privacy of the system. In addition to the first implementation of this frame-
work, which used two fingerprints and showed increases in both security and privacy,
the implementation presented here also provides cancelability. Cancelability of the
multi-biometric template is achieved by changing the pass-phrase uttered by the
speaker, since the generated voice minutiae depends on the pass-phrase comprised
of a unique sequence of phonemes.
Finally, in the last chapter, our contribution on the literature of speaker veri-
fication and multi-biometric template generation is summarized and some possible
extensions are given.
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CHAPTER 2
Hidden Markov Models
The hidden Markov model is a statistical model used for modeling an underly-
ing Markov process whose states are hidden to the outside, but observable through
the associated outcomes. The model consists of a finite set of hidden states, where
the state transitions are controlled by the transition probabilities. Furthermore; in
any state, there is also a probability distribution for emitting a certain outcome. It is
only the outcome or the observations which are visible externally, and the challenge
is to predict the state sequence of the process which are “hidden” to the outside;
hence the name hidden Markov model.
An HMM can be fully characterized by [48]:
(1) The number of states in the model, N. Most of the time there
is some physical significance attached to the set of states of the
model even though the they are hidden. The states are denoted
by S = {S1, S2, S3...SN} and the state at time t as qt.
(2) The number of distinct observation symbols per state, M. Obser-
vation symbols corresponds to the physical outcome (e.g. LPC
or MFCC vectors as speech features) of the system being mod-
eled. The observations can belong to a discrete alphabet or the
set of real vectors. In case of MFCC vectors for voice data, the
set of possible observations are the set of real vectors. For the
case of a discrete alphabet, M is the discrete alphabet size and
individual symbols are denoted as V = {v1, v2, v3...vM} for an
observation sequence O = {O1, O2, O3...Ot}. Here, O1 and O2
can be the same observation symbol vk.
(3) The state transition probabilities among hidden states A={aij}
where
aij = P (qt+1 = Sj|qt = Si for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N .
(4) The observation probability distribution in state j for the emis-
sion of a visible observation vk, B={bjk} where
bjk = P (vk(t)|qt = Sj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ M for a
discrete alphabet of outcomes.
(5) The initial state distribution pi = P (q1 = Si) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
In order to generate a hidden Markov model, the parameters described above
need to be calculated from training examples. In a Markov model, the state is
directly visible to the observer, and therefore the state transition probabilities are
the only parameters. In a hidden Markov model, the state is not directly visible,
but observations (e.g. voice feature vectors) affected by the states are. Therefore,
observation probabilities need to be calculated as well. At the end, the trained
model can be used to estimate the most likely state sequence, or the probability
that the observations were generated by that model.
HMMs are widely used in pattern recognition applications such as speech,
handwriting, and gesture recognition, as well as bioinformatics. In case of speech
recognition, observable parameters would be speech feature vectors (LPC, MFCC,
etc) of an incoming utterance and the hidden states would be the associated phonemes.
Figure 2.1 below shows the state transition diagram of a simple HMM. There
are only two states S1 and S2 and two possible observations V1 and V2. As described
above, aij shows the transition probabilities from state i to state j. Moreover, bjk
shows observation probabilities for observing outcome k from state j.
Figure 2.1: States (S1, S2) and observations (V1, V2) are illustrated by ellipses where
the state transition and observation probabilities are illustrated by arrows.
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There are three central issues associated with HMMs given the form and pa-
rameters described above. The first problem is referred as the likelihood computa-
tion problem [45]. It constitutes the computation of the probability of a particular
output P (O|λ) given the observation sequence O = {O1, O2, O3...Ot} and the model
λ = (A,B, pi). This problem mainly addresses the case if there are multiple models
to choose from for a given observation. An example scenario would be to choose
the most likely speaker-dependent model for a set of feature vectors which belong
to a test pass-phrase. To solve this problem, forward algorithm [29] or backward
algorithm [26] can be employed.
The second problem is referred as the decoding problem [45] and constitutes
finding the most likely sequence of hidden states Q = {q1, q2, q3...qt} that could have
generated an output sequence O = {O1, O2, O3...Ot} given the model λ = (A,B, pi)
and the output. The solution to this problem helps to find the corresponding
phonemes or words for each feature vector in a given speech sample for a speech
recognition scenario. To solve this problem, Viterbi algorithm is employed whose
details can be found in [19].
The third and the most difficult problem is referred as the learning problem
[45] and constitutes the estimation of model parameters λ = (A,B, pi) to maxi-
mize P (O|λ) given the observations. In fact, given any finite observation sequence
there is no optimal way of estimating these parameters. As a practical solution, it-
erative approaches such as Baum-Welch or Expectation-Maximization methods are
employed to locally maximize P (O|λ). This problem constitutes the training session
of a word-based or phoneme-based HMM to be employed in a speech recognition
system. After the parameters are optimized, the likelihood of a test sequence of
feature vectors to a word or phoneme model can be easily calculated. The details
of the algorithms can be found in [27, 8]. The details of aforementioned algorithms
are not given in this chapter since the theoretical background of these algorithms
are beyond the scope of this work.
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CHAPTER 3
Text-Dependent Speaker Verification
In this chapter, we present a novel text-dependent speaker verification sys-
tem. For text-dependent verification systems, features from multiple utterances of
the users are compared with the features extracted from the test utterance. Here,
temporal information plays an important role since the sequence of extracted fea-
tures from the utterance determines the decision of verification. For the proposed
verification system, acoustic features are extracted from individual frames and ut-
terances are aligned via phonetic HMMs both for enrollment and verification. After
the alignment, fixed-length feature vectors are extracted from the utterances de-
pending the uttered text independent of the time it takes to utter that text. For
enrollment, every user in the database is assigned a 6-digit password and reference
vectors are extracted from utterances of these unique user passwords in order to
acquire speaker statistics. For verification, the test vector extracted from the test
utterance is fed into a previously trained classifier. Bayesian classifier and a linear
classifier in conjunction with Principal Component are used to verify a test utterance
for this work.
3.1 Previous Work
Diversity of text-dependent systems mainly arises from the types of extracted
voice features and speaker template/model creating schemes. In general, hidden
Markov models (HMM) and Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) are used for the align-
ment of utterances [42, 14]. Bellagarda et al introduced a text-dependent system
by using singular value decomposition for spectral content matching and DTW for
temporal alignment of the utterances [23]. For every user, 4 utterances were used
as reference, 4 utterances were used genuine and 2 utterances from impostors who
were given access to the original enrollment pass-phrases of the claimed speaker. In
addition to that, impostors tried to mimic genuine users by changing accent and
intonation. On a private database of 93 people (48 genuine, 45 impostor), their
result show an EER around 4%.
Yegnanarayana employed difference features such as pitch and duration, along
with other well known spectral features such as Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(MFCC) to construct a TD speaker verification system [13]. DTW was used for
utterance matching and error rate is reported to be under 5% for a private database
of 30 speakers where all users uttered the same text according to the claimed id
from a limited pool of sentences.
Ramasubramanian et al proposed an MFCC-based TD speaker verification
system where multiple word templates were created for each speaker. For testing,
a variable text (sequence of digits) was prompted to speakers on different testing
sessions and is aligned via dynamic programming. This means, the text was known
to forgers for the proposes text-dependent speaker verification system. The success
rate was reported to increase with the number of templates for the same word where
the results were given for 1 to 5 templates per digit. In particular, authors found
that when using the TIDIGITS database (100 people), the best error rate was under
0.1% when using 5 templates per digit. However, part of this low error rate was due
to cohort normalization, which was done by scaling the test utterance score with
the best matching impostor in the database. Therefore, the task here was more
like identification which increases the success of this closed-set speaker verification
system [54].
Subramanya et al proposed a text-dependent system using the likelihood ratio
test by comparing global and adapted user-specific HMMs [10]. They obtained user-
specific HMMs from global models of digit utterances using discriminative learning
approaches. In order to verify a test utterance Subramanya et al. calculated likeli-
hood scores of both global HMMs and user-specific HMMs derived from the global
models. Here, the global models act like background models for the speaker verifi-
cation task. Moreover, a boosting procedure was applied and weighted word-level
likelihood scores were fused with utterance level scores. With this approach, some
words (digits in this case) had more discriminative power when the likelihood of ut-
terance models were calculated for the scenario that the impostors know the claimed
passwords. A portion of the YOHO corpus is used where they have achieved an EER
of 0.26% for 6 digit pass-phrases in comparison with the baseline likelihood ratio
test method which gives 0.63% EER.
Similarly, Liu et al proposed a system using segmental HMMs [60] whose states
were associated with sequences of acoustic feature vectors rather than individual
vectors to explore the role of dynamic information in TD systems . They obtained
a 44% reduction in false acceptance rate using the segmental model compared with
a conventional HMM on the YOHO corpus.
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3.2 Proposed Method
Text-dependent speaker verification assumes the existence of a pass-phrase.
In fact, often multiple utterances of the same pass-phrase is used to create the user
template. In this work, we use pass-phrases that consists of digit sequences. An
overview of the proposed verification system is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: System overview: The test utterance is compared with the reference
vectors of the claimed identity and accepted if their dissimilarity is low.
For enrollment and verification, the utterances are first aligned using a speaker-
independent HMM model of the claimed pass-phrase. Then fixed-length feature
vectors are extracted from the aligned utterances and dissimilarities of each reference
vector with the test vector is calculated. Using the distance scores to the reference
set, a classifier decide whether the the test utterance is genuine or forgery. Details
of the verification process are explained in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Feature Extraction
The features employed in speaker recognition systems should successfully be
able to define the vocal characteristics of the speaker and distinguish it from the
voices of other speakers. Short spectra of speech signals give information about
both the spoken words and the voice of the speaker. In particular, we use the Mel
frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) features in this work. MFCCs utilize the
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logarithmic energies of the speech data after being filtered by nonuniform frequency
filters, in a manner similar to the human hearing system. Then, discrete cosine
transform is applied to the filtered speech data for further decorrelation of the spec-
tral features [52]. To extract the MFCC features, an utterance is divided into 30ms
frames with 10ms overlap and cepstral analysis is applied to each frame. As a result,
each 30ms frame is represented by a 12-dimensional vector < c1, ..., c12 > consisting
of MFCCs for this work. Beside MFCCs, another approach is to use linear pre-
diction coding (LPC) coefficients or a combination of LPC and MFC coefficients.
LPC analysis is based on the linear model of speech production and is very suitable
for speech analysis and synthesis purposes. However, we used MFCCs as features
to represent utterances since state-of-the-art automatic speaker recognition systems
are based on the spectral features [15].
The database used for this work was originally designed for speech recognition
and was not suitable for text-dependent speaker verification systems. In order to
obtain multiple sequences of the same password, we segmented the utterances in
the database into digits, using phonetic HMMs. Thus, the feature extraction in our
framework is preceded by the alignment of the utterances (references and query)
after extracting MFCC features from individual frames.
The alignment is done using an HMM of the spoken password of the claimed
identity. These pass-phrase models are formed by concatenating the HMMs of its
constituent phonemes. As an example, the hidden Markov model of the pass-phrase
“235798” is formed by concatenating the phoneme models of “t”, “uw”, “th” for “2”
and so on. The goal of aligning pass-phrases is to remove the silence frames and seg-
ment the utterance into the phonemes of the pass-phrase. At the end, corresponding
frames and phonemes are revealed with silences.
The phoneme models in turn are 3-state, monophone HMMs, constructed
for each phoneme found in the digits of the English language. They are speaker-
independent models, trained using a separate part of the database. The details
of the training process is described in section 2. Phonetic HMMs are commonly
used in speech recognition and 3-state monophone models are generally preferred to
model phoneme transitions. The alignment process is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
After the alignment, frames which correspond only to the middle state of each
phoneme are kept, while the remaining frames (those corresponding to the 1st and 3rd
states) are deleted. This is done to use only steady-state portions of each phone, and
eliminate the start and end states that are more affected by the neighbouring phones.
We then calculate the mean feature vector of cepstral coefficients for each phoneme.
After the calculations, each phoneme p is represented by a 12-dimensional mean
vector Fp. Using this method, fixed-length feature vectors can be extracted from
varying-length utterances consisting of the same digits. The concatenation of the
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Figure 3.2: Alignment with the global HMM: Previously trained 3-state phonetic
HMMs are used in aligning an utterance with the corresponding password model
(e.g. “ONE”), which consists of a sequence of the corresponding phoneme models
(e.g. “w”, “ah”, “n”).
mean vectors of the phonemes then forms the feature vector for the entire utterance.
Creation of fixed-length pass-phrase feature vectors is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
In our experimental setup, test utterances consist 4 or 6 digits (e.g. “2357981”).
Since digits in the English language is composed of three phonemes on average,
test utterances are composed of around 12 or 18 phonemes. This means, 12 or 18
phoneme vectors are extracted from each test utterance on average.
3.2.2 Enrollment
For speaker verification, it is necessary to go through a speaker specific enroll-
ment session. The purpose of the enrollment session is to create password references
for each speaker in the database. First, we randomly selected 4 or 6-digit passwords
(e.g. “235798”) for each speaker where each digit is used only once in a password to
make best use of the available data in the database. Then, artificial password feature
vectors are created for each speaker by segmenting and recombining the available
utterances in the enrollment set after MFCC based feature vectors are extracted
by the feature extraction method described in 3.2.1. We call this reference feature
set Pj for each speaker j to be compared during verification tests. This process is
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.3: Derivation of the feature vector for the whole utterance: First and third
phases of the phonemes are discarded and the average of feature vector of the middle
phase frames are concatenated to obtain the feature vector.
Later, these reference feature vectors of a speaker are pairwise compared. and
similarity scores are calculated between each pair of vectors. Hence, if there are N
reference vectors for each speaker N(N−1) distances per speaker are calculated. To
find the similarity/distance between the feature vectors of two utterances, we used
the trimmed Euclidean distance metric [16]. In this metric, the Euclidean distance is
measured between two feature vectors after discarding the highest valued dimensions
of the difference vector, so that the remaining dimensions are more robust to certain
noise artifacts. We have used the same percentage (10%) of discarded dimensions,
as in [16]. Note here that the feature vectors are all the same length, regardless of
the length of the utterances, due to the feature extraction process.
Using these distances, the following statistics defining the variation among a
user’s reference templates are extracted, as in [5]:
• average of the nearest neighbor distances,
• average of the farthest neighbor distances,
• minimum of the average distance to all neighbors,
• average distance from reference vectors to the mean vector of the
reference feature set Pj
Average of the nearest neighbor distances may indicate how similar a reference
utterance to expect, given a query utterance. Average of the farthest neighbor
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Figure 3.4: The creation of artificial reference passwords: Parsed digit utterances
are concatenated to form reference password utterances and feature vectors are
extracted.
distances may indicate how far a reference utterance would be at most, given a query
utterance. By computing the minimum of the average distance to all neighbors, we
in fact designate the template utterance which is closest to all other references.
User’s reference features set Pj together with the calculated parameters are stored
to be used in the verification process.
3.2.3 Verification
For verification, the MFCC-based fixed-length feature vector is extracted from
the query utterance first. The query feature extraction is done as described in 3.2.1,
following the alignment with the corresponding global HMM model. This feature
vector is then compared with each reference utterance of the claimed identity, as
well as its mean reference vector.
As a result of the comparisons between the query and reference vectors, we
find the distances to the closest reference vector, the farthest reference vector, the
template reference vector (defined as the one having the smallest total distance to the
other reference utterances) and the mean reference vector (the mean of the reference
vectors). We use these four distances as input features for the final decision (accept
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or reject), after appropriate normalization. In this work, distances are normalized
by the corresponding averages of the reference set (e.g. averages of the nearest and
farthest neighbor distances of the reference utterances), as described in 3.2.2 and
previously used in [5]. Note that normalizing the measured distances eliminates the
need for user-dependent thresholds, so the final features were used in comparison to
a fixed, speaker-independent threshold. The verification process which is shown by
a box in Figure 3.1 is further illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Verification process: A 4-dimensional feature vector is extracted from
the MFCC-based test vector by calculating the distance to the closest reference
vector, the farthest reference vector, the template reference vector and the mean
vector of reference vector set of the claimed identity. This 4-dimensional feature
vector is later classified as genuine or forgery by a previously trained classifier.
For this work, we have experimented with two different classifiers that take as
input the normalized distances and return a decision on the query utterance. The
training set used to train the classifiers consists of normalized distances obtained
from 163 genuine utterances (1 from each user) and 7472 forgery utterances (1 from
each impostor in the same group of each claimed user), not used in the testing, as
described in Section 3.3.
One of the classifiers is a Bayes classifier assuming normal distributions for the
normalized distances, while the other is a linear classifier following Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) of the normalized distances. According to the Bayes theorem,
the test utterance should be assigned to the class (genuine or forgery) having the
largest posterior probability P(Ck|X), given the 4-dimensional normalized distance
vector, X, in order to minimize the probability of utterance misclassification. These
posterior probabilities are calculated as in Eq. 3.1:
P (Ck|X) =
P (X|Ck)P (Ck)
P (X)
(3.1)
where k denotes classes (either genuine or forgery).
Using the Bayes classifier, the prior probabilities of classes, P(Cg) for genuine
and P(Cf ) for forgery, are assumed to be equal since we do not know the exact
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statistics. Following this assumption, the discriminant function for the Bayesian
classifier further simplifies to g(X) = P (X|Cg) − P (X|Cf ) and class-conditional
probabilities P(X|Ck) needed to determine the decision boundaries were estimated
from the training set utterances.
With PCA, 4-dimensional feature vectors (normalized distances) are reduced
to 1-dimensional values by projecting them onto the eigenvector (principal compo-
nent) corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the training set. Then, a threshold
value is found to separate the genuine and forgery utterances of the validation data.
This threshold is later used in classifying the test utterances after projecting the
4-dimensional feature vectors onto the same principal component. Details on PCA
can be found in [24].
3.3 Database
We used the TIDIGITS database which is originally constructed for speech
recognition of digits. The database consists of varying length sequences of digits
(e.g. “235798”), uttered by 326 speakers in the database (111 men, 114 women,
50 boys, and 51 girls). Each person utters 77 digit sequences, with length varying
between 1 and 7, for a total of 253 digits. Hence, each one of the 11 digits (0-9,
and “oh”) is uttered roughly 23 times (= 253/11) and at least 16 times by each
person. The TIDIGITS database contains a single data collection session whereas
some databases may contain multiple sessions distributed over time to form more
robust templates.
The database is originally designed for speech recognition and was not suit-
able for text-dependent speaker verification systems. In order to obtain multiple
sequences of the same password, as needed in a text-dependent speaker verification,
we segmented the utterances in the database into digits, using the previously de-
scribed HMMs. This resulted in 16 or more utterances of the same digit by each
user. Ten of each of these digits are used for enrollment (reference passwords), 5 for
verification (genuine and forgery tests) and 1 for training the classifiers.
Utterances from half of the speakers of each of the 4 groups (men, women,
boys, girls) are used to train the phonetic HMMs while the remaining 163 speakers
(56 men, 57 women, 25 boys, and 25 girls) are used in constructing the enrollment,
genuine and forgery sets described below. In fact, this 163 speaker subset is what we
refer to as the “database” throughout the thesis. The utterances from the remaining
speakers are used to train the phonetic HMMs.
To create the enrollment set, we randomly picked a 4 or 6-digit password
for each user in the database and created artificial utterances of this password by
combining segments of the constituent digits. A password here is a string of non-
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repeated digits, so as to best use the available data. After creating the enrollment
set, genuine test cases were created using the unused digits of the same user (5/16+).
As for forgery tests, two sets of tests were constructed according to password blind-
ness. For the password-blind tests (PB), forgery feature vectors are created by the
concatenation of random digit sequences of the forger (4 or 6-digits, matching the
length of the password to be forged) after feature extraction. Password-known tests
are conducted to simulate the scenario of a stolen password. Therefore, forgery ut-
terances are created using the same digit sequence as the claimed password for the
PK tests.
The enrollment set thus consists of a total of 1630 (10 utterances x 163 speak-
ers) reference passwords where each recorded digit is used only once. The genuine
test set contains 815 (5 utterances x 163 speakers) genuine passwords constructed
from genuine, segmented digit recordings. The forgery test set contains 7472(56x55
for men + 57x56 for women + 25x24 for boys + 25x24 for girls) forgery passwords
constructed from segmented digit recordings of other people. Here, each speaker
forges every other speaker in the same group (men/women/ boys/girls) with only
one utterance of the claimed password. In other words, each speaker is forged
by all the remaining speakers within the group once who knows his/her password.
Since there are only 5 utterances of each digit by each speaker in the verification
set, a recorded digit of a speaker is used multiple times for the creation of forgery
utterances whereas necessary digits are used only once for creating genuine test ut-
terances. Finally, the training set used for training classifiers contains a set of 163
genuine (constructed from unused digit samples of each user) and 7472 forgery ut-
terances (created from reference digits of other users that are not used in testing).
Thus, genuine or forgery utterances in training set are not used in testing, though
they do come from the same speaker set.
One may think that the artificial construction of the passwords does not result
in a realistic database with proper coarticulation of the consecutive digits. However,
removing the frames corresponding to the first and third states of monophone models
(as in our model) reduces the effect of coarticulation since those states are affected
by coarticulation the most. Hence, while coarticulation effects would exist with real
data (passwords uttered as a digit sequence), we believe that the results would be
largely unaffected. Artificial database creation is also used by other authors [54, 10].
3.4 Results
The performance evaluation of both speaker verification systems proposed in
this work is done by considering the false acceptance (FAR) and false rejection
(FRR) rates during the tests. FAR is calculated as the ratio of falsely verified
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impostor utterances to the total number of imposter tests and FRR is calculated as
the ratio of falsely rejected genuine utterances to the total number of genuine tests.
EER and HER indicate Equal Error rate (where FRR and FAR are made equal by
changing the acceptance threshold) the and Half Error Rate (average of FRR and
FAR, when EER cannot be obtained).
Separate tests are conducted according to password blindness where the forger
did not know the claimed password(PB and PK); the classification method (Bayes
and PCA); the password length (4 or 6 digit); and whether the forgers were selected
from the same group as the person being forged, or the whole population (same
group - SG or all groups - AG). As one can expect, the former (SG) is a more
challenging scenario.
Perfect verification results (0% EER) were achieved for the password-blind
(PB) scenario, with both classifiers and for both password lengths; therefore, we
only list the results for the more challenging password-known case in Table 3.1. The
results using PCA-based classifier (shown in bold) are the best, with 0.61% EER
for 6-digit passwords for the SG scenario and 0.39% for the AG scenario while the
HER rates for the Bayes classifier are higher.
Scenario
Bayes PCA
FRR FAR HER EER
6Digit & Same Group (SG) 1.47 0.12 0.80 0.61
6Digit & All Groups (AG) 1.47 0.05 0.76 0.39
4Digit & Same Group (SG) 1.60 0.62 1.11 1.10
4Digit & All Groups (AG) 1.22 0.30 0.76 0.63
Table 3.1: False Reject Rate, False Accept Rate, Half Error Rate and Equal Error
Rates are given for the password-known scenario and 4 or 6-digit passwords, for
different classification methods (Bayes, PCA) and whether the forger was selected
from the same group as the person being forged, or the whole population.
The DET figure showing how FAR And FRR changes with different acceptance
thresholds is shown in Figure 3.6, for the PCA method.
Further tests were done to see if the performance would improve, if we knew
the group (men/women/boys/girls) of the forged person. Note that this information
can be derived from a person’s age and gender which are public information. For
this case, separate classifiers were trained for each group, using as forgers other
people from the same group. In other words, if a man was being forged, we used
a classifier trained with only information coming from adult male subjects. The
results in Table 3.2 show that the error rates for men and women are very similar
(0.31 and 0.36%), while that of children (boys and girls groups) are almost twice
as much (0.73 and 0.98%). This can be explained as the younger groups showing
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Figure 3.6: DET curves for different password lengths, different forger source, using
the password-known scenario and the PCA-based classifier.
more variability in their utterances since the features used in this classification are
normalized distances to the reference set of the forged user. Overall, the average
EER given in Table 3.2 is slightly lower than the comparable result in Table 3.1
(0.49 vs 0.61%).
Group
Bayes PCA
FRR FAR HER EER
women(57) 0.70 0.09 0.40 0.31
men(56) 0.71 0.13 0.42 0.36
boy(25) 0.80 0.50 0.65 0.73
girls(25) 2.40 0.50 1.55 0.98
average(163) 0.98 0.23 0.61 0.49
Table 3.2: Error rates are given separately for each group, for the password-known
scenario, 6-digit passwords, and different classification methods (Bayes, PCA). For
these results, the classifiers are trained separately for each group.
3.5 Summary and Contributions
In this chapter, we presented a new method for text-dependent speaker ver-
ification. The system is faster and uses less memory as compared to the conven-
tional HMM-based approach. In our system, we only use a single set of speaker-
independent monophone HMM models. This set is used for alignment, whereas for
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the conventional HMM-based approach, an adapted HMM set for each speaker is
constructed in addition to a speaker independent HMM set (also called universal
background model in that context). This requires much higher amount of memory
as compared to the proposed approach. In addition, during testing only a single
HMM alignment is required as compared to two HMM alignments using a univer-
sal background model and a speaker model for the conventional approach. Thus,
verification is also faster with the approach introduced in this thesis.
The results from our system (0.61 and 0.39% EER) may be compared to the
results of Ramasubramanian et al. (under 0.1% EER) who have used the same
database under similar conditions [54]. They use multiple utterances of the same
digit to create digit templates which are used in verifying utterances of a known
digit sequence. However, their EER is lower through cohort normalization using a
closed-set verification scenario. In other words, the decision mechanism does not
only know about the similarity of the query utterance, but also the similarity of the
forgery utterances, which significantly improves verification performance.
Similarly, the results by Subramanya et al [10] who created a database suitable
for text-dependent verification from the original YOHO database may also be com-
pared to ours. However, their results of 0.26% should be compared to the average
of “men” and “women” groups (0.34%) in our work since “boys” and “girls” groups
do not exist in the YOHO database.
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CHAPTER 4
Text-Independent Speaker Verification
We have also implemented a text-independent speaker verification method
using the TIDIGITS database. Text-independent speaker verification systems are
designed to verify any query utterance without the information of the uttered words
or sentences. Many TI speaker verification methods have been proposed in litera-
ture. These methods mainly differ by their feature selection and speaker modeling
processes. Most popular approaches for speaker modeling are Gaussian mixture
models (GMM) and support vector machines (SVM), as well as their derivatives
and combinations. In addition, other techniques such as vector quantization (VQ)
and utterance level scoring have also been used [21, 61]. These issues are discussed
thoroughly in [46].
We implemented a text-independent speaker verification method using the
TIDIGITS database. Our proposed system depends on creating speaker specific
phoneme codebooks. Once phoneme codebooks are created on the enrollment stage
using HMM alignment and segmentation, test utterances are verified by calculat-
ing the total dissimilarity/distance to the claimed codebook. An overview of the
proposed verification system is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: System overview: The test utterance is compared with the phoneme
codebooks of the claimed identity and accepted if their dissimilarity is low.
For enrollment, we assume that transcriptions of the enrollment utterances
are available; in other words, we know the verbal information of the utterances.
This way, enrollment utterances are segmented via phoneme-based HMMs and vec-
tor codebooks are created. On the other hand, we do not make this assumption
in verification, since the task at hand is text-independent verification. Thus, query
utterances are not segmented via HMMs for verification since we cannot predict the
uttered words or sentences. Although this is possible via an automatic speech rec-
ognizer (ASR), the results would not be 100% correct and thus would be misleading
for the speaker verifier.
The results for the proposed text-independent speaker verification method is
compared with the most popular and successful approach which employs Gaussian
Mixture Models to model vocal characteristics of speakers. In order to make an
objective comparison with the previously described text-dependent system, new set
of tests are conducted using the same amount of enrollment and verification voice
data.
4.1 Previous Work
Although cepstral features are employed dominantly in literature, several other
features are also investigated. Day and Nandi proposed a TI speaker verification
system where different features such as linear prediction coefficients (LPC), percep-
tual linear prediction coefficients (PLP) and MFCC (acoustic, spectral, etc.) are
fused and the speaker verification is done via applying genetic programming meth-
ods [41]. Furthermore, the effects of dynamic features such as spectral delta features
with novel delta cepstral energies (DCE) on TI speaker verification is investigated
by Nostratighods et al [32]. Zheng et al, adopted the GMM-UBM approach for
proposing new features derived from the vocal source excitation and the vocal tract
system. This new feature is named wavelet octave coefficients of residues (WOCOR)
and is based on time-frequency analysis of the linear predictive residual signal [38].
Recently, the GMM employing a universal background model (UBM) with
MAP speaker adaptation has become the dominant approach in TI speaker verifi-
cation. UBM is also a GMM which serves as a background distribution of human
acoustic feature space. Current state-of-the art techniques are adopted from this
GMM-UBM method by proposing different adaptation and decision criteria to cre-
ate discriminative speaker models [51, 43, 40]. Several of these adaptation methods
are examined in [31]. Moreover, Nuisance attribute projection (NAP) and factor
analysis (FA) are also examined to provide improvements over the baseline GMM-
UBM method [11].
Beside GMMs, support vector machines are also quite powerful tools that are
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used for speaker verification. M.Liu et al proposed a system using SVMs together
with the features from the adoption of GMMs [30]. Wan and Renals proposed a
system based on sequence discriminant SVM and showed improvement with respect
to the well known GMM method [55]. Campbell et al modeled high-level features
from frequencies of phoneme n-grams in speaker conversation and fused them with
cepstral features to be used by SVMs [57].
4.2 GMM-based Speaker Verification
The GMM framework is a very successful method in the literature of text-
independent speaker verification. As a baseline, a GMM-based system is imple-
mented using the TIDIGITS database for this work.
4.2.1 Enrollment
The features employed in a text-independent speaker recognition systems
should also be able to define the vocal characteristics of the speaker and distin-
guish it from the voices of other speakers without employing the temporal infor-
mation in the uttered text. As described in the previous chapter, short spectra of
speech signals gives information about both the spoken words and the voice of the
speaker. We also used the Mel frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) features for
text-independent speaker verification. First, MFCC features are extracted to repre-
sent each frame with a 12-D feature vector for both enrollment and verification as
described briefly in section 3.2.1.
For the GMM based method, all frames in the utterances of the enrollment
set are used to train the mixture of Gaussians to model the speakers in the database
unlike the segmentation process via HMMs. Generally speaking, an Ng component
Gaussian mixture for Nd dimensional input vectors has the following form:
P (x|M) =
Ng∑
i=1
ai
1
(2pi)Nd/2|Σi|1/2
× exp
(
−
1
2
(x− µi)
TΣ−1i (x− µi)
)
(4.1)
where P(x|M) is the likelihood of an input vector x given the Gaussian mixture
model M. Nd equals 12 for our case since we extract 12-D MFCC features from
individual frames. The mixture model consists of a weighted sum over Ng Gaussian
densities, each parametrized by a mean vector µi and a covariance matrix Σi where
ai are the mixture weights. These weights are constrained to be non-negative and
sum up to one. Since the acoustic space is limited with digits in the English language
for this work, the number of mixtures, Ng, is chosen as 32. The parameters of a
Gaussian mixture model ai, µi and Σi for i=1...Ng are estimated using the maximum
likelihood criterion and the EM (expectation maximisation) algorithm [8]. All frames
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of utterances in the enrollment set are employed for this estimation process regardless
of the uttered text. Although it is usual to employ GMMs consisting of components
with diagonal covariance matrices, we employ GMMs with full covariance matrix
for better modeling.
For the GMM based method, each speaker is represented by a unique speaker
model consisting of density weights ai, density mean vectors µi, and covariance
matrices Σi where i = 1,...,32 after the enrollment process.
4.2.2 Verification
After individual GMMs are trained using the maximum likelihood criterion
to estimate the probability density functions P(xi|M) of the client speakers, the
probability P(X|M) that a test utterance X = x1, ..., xL is generated by the model
M is used as the utterance score where L is the number of frames in an utterance.
This probability for the entire utterance is estimated by the mean log-likelihood over
the sequence of frames that make up the whole utterance as follows:
S(X) = logP (X|M) =
1
L
L∑
i=1
logP (xi|M) (4.2)
This utterance score is then used to make a decision by comparing it against
a threshold that has been fixed for a desired EER. An alternative approach would
be to generate a universal background model (UBM) and employ the log-likelihood
ratio test as a 2-class classification problem where the log-likelihood score of the
claimed model is compared to the world model. Here, the threshold is assumed to
be 1 so the utterances are verified if the log-likelihood scores of the claimed model
are higher than of the world model.
4.3 Proposed Method
4.3.1 Feature Extraction and Enrollment
As described in detail in Section 3.2.1, MFCCs are extracted from both en-
rollment and verification set utterances for the proposed system during the feature
extraction stage. However, utterances in the enrollment set are aligned with the
previously trained phonetic HMMs to segment the phonemes where the utterances
of the verification set are left unaligned.
After MFCC features are extracted and the utterances are aligned in the
enrollment set, these utterances are segmented into phonemes to create speaker
specific phoneme codebooks. These codebooks Ci consist of 12-dimensional phoneme
vectors Fp which are formed by taking the mean of the second state frames of
24
phoneme p from different utterances of user i. Formation of the phoneme vectors is
described in detail in Section 3.2.1.
Phoneme codebooks for all speakers in the database are formed from the enroll-
ment set utterances for the proposed TI system. Mean vectors are then calculated
for each phoneme cluster and the resulting vector Cpi is assigned as the centroid
to represent phoneme p of speaker i. At the end, the enrollment process is com-
plete yielding 20 x N (20 phonemes x N speakers) 12-D centroids representing each
phoneme of every speaker.
4.3.2 Verification
In order to verify a test utterance, MFCC based feature vectors are extracted
first from all frames of the utterance. Then, a difference vector D is calculated
by finding the nearest centroid for each frame vector in an utterance X of length L
from the codebook of the claimed speaker. The distance metric used is the Euclidean
distance without any modifications as explained in the previous chapter since the
phoneme vectors have only 12 dimensions. Calculation of the difference vector D is
shown below in equation 4.3.
D(l) = min
p∈P
√√√√ 12∑
j=1
(Xl(j)− Cpi(j))
2 for ∀l ∈ L (4.3)
Here, the values in vector D are frame level distances in an utterance X. As the
next step, utterance level score is calculated by taking the trimmed L2-norm of the
difference vector D. This is done by calculating the Euclidean norm after discarding
the highest valued dimensions in the vector, so that the remaining dimensions are
more robust to certain noise artifacts. We have used the same percentage (10%) of
discarded dimensions, as in section 3.2.1.
4.4 Database
To test our proposed text-independent speaker verification system and com-
pare it with the baseline GMM-based system, we used the TIDIGITS database. The
database consists of uttered digit sequences and is originally constructed for speech
recognition. The details of the database are explained in Section 3.3.
For the implementation of the text-independent verification systems, the database
of 163 speakers is divided into two sets for enrollment and verification. Enrollment
set constitutes 1630 (10 utterances x 163 speakers) 3-digit and 1630 (10 utterances
x 163 speakers) 4-digit speech samples. Speaker codebooks for the proposed method
or GMM-based speaker models are created by using the frames of these utterances.
Moreover, the utterances are not repetitive in the verification set in order to have
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a fair distribution of existing phonemes for modeling speakers’ vocal characteris-
tics. In other words, original utterances of TIDIGITS database are employed for
the proposed and GMM-based text-independent speaker verification systems.
On the other hand, verification set consists of 815 (5 utterances x 163 speakers)
7-digit utterances. As in the text-dependent verification system, 5 utterances in
the verification set of each speaker are used only once for genuine attacks whereas
they are used multiple times in a random manner when claiming other speakers’
identities. Since the systems should be independent of text, there is no need to
segment and concatenate the existing utterances as it has been done for the text-
dependent system for the verification set.
4.5 Results
The performance evaluation of both text-independent speaker verification sys-
tems in this work is done by considering the false acceptance (FAR) and false rejec-
tion (FRR) rates during the tests. FAR is calculated as the ratio of falsely verified
impostor utterances to the total number of impostor tests and FRR is calculated as
the ratio of falsely rejected genuine utterances to the total number of genuine tests.
EER and HER indicate Equal Error rate (where FRR and FAR are made equal by
changing the acceptance threshold) the and Half Error Rate (average of FRR and
FAR, when EER cannot be obtained).
Separate tests are conducted according to the classification method (proposed
and baseline GMM method) and whether the forgers were selected from the same
group as the person being forged, or the whole population (same group - SG or all
groups - AG). As one can expect, the former (SG) is a more challenging scenario. For
comparison, previously described text-dependent system (for known password sce-
nario where the forger utters the same sequence of digits as in the claimed password)
is also implemented with identical enrollment and verification sets as employed for
the text-independent systems. For the results of the text-dependent system to be
used as a benchmark, PCA with a linear classifier is utilized for comparison tests.
The results for the GMM-based method with 0.61% EER are superior to our
proposed method for the text-independent verification case with 5.79% EER for
the SG scenario; however the proposed text-dependent system performs better with
0.38% EER for the password-known scenario in which the forger knows the claimed
password. For the AG scenario, again the GMM-based method with 0.31% EER
is superior to our proposed method for the text-independent verification case with
5.79% EER; however the text-dependent system performs even better with 0.22%
EER for the conditions described above. We list the results for both cases in Table
4.1.
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Scenario Same Group (SG) All Groups (AG)
TD-PCA 0.39 0.22
TI-GMM 0.62 0.31
TI-Proposed 5.79 3.56
Table 4.1: Equal error rates are given for different classification methods (TD-PCA,
TI-GMM, TI-Proposed) and whether the forger was selected from the same group
as the person being forged, or the whole population.
Utilization of time dependent information (e.g. sequence of uttered digits)
can be considered as the main strength of text-dependent verification systems as
well as the acoustic features independent of text. Uttering a different sequence of
digits than the enrolled pass-phrase ideally results in rejection of a genuine speaker
in text-dependent verification systems, thus the role of temporal information is sig-
nificant. For the case where the forger knows the password of the claimed speaker,
extracted features from the utterance are only compared with corresponding tem-
plates/references (e.g. concatenated phoneme vectors in our case) and the role of
the time dependent information is mainly reduced. Still, depending on the fea-
tures extracted from the utterance (e.g. delta-MFCC or delta-delta-MFCC) some
temporal information is used during verification. For the proposed text-dependent
verification system, only MFCC features are utilized to extract fixed-length feature
vectors and temporal information is discarded considerably. In this case, verification
decision is considered to be done solely by the acoustic nature of the uttered text
regardless of the length of the utterance. This is why our results for password-known
scenario of text-dependent speaker verification tests are comparable with the results
of text-independent verification tests.
Further tests were done to see if the performance would improve, if we knew
the group (men/women/boys/girls) of the forged person. Note that this information
can be derived from a person’s age and gender which are public information. For
this case, separate classifiers were trained for each group, using as forgers other
people from the same group. In other words, if a man was being forged, we used
a classifier trained with only information coming from adult male subjects. The
results in Table 4.2 show that the error rates for men and women are much lower
that of children (boys and girls groups) for all cases.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a text-independent speaker verification system us-
ing phoneme codebooks. These codebooks are generated by aligning the enrollment
utterances using phonetic HMMs and creating MFCC-based fixed-length feature
vectors to represent each phoneme. For verification, we define a distance metric
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Group TD-PCA TI-GMM TI-Proposed
boys 0.65 0.82 8.80
girls 0.82 0.73 6.37
men 0.36 0.22 2.67
women 0.18 0.34 4.92
average 0.41 0.43 4.96
Table 4.2: Error rates are given separately for each group and different classification
methods (TD-PCA, TI-GMM, TI-Proposed). For these results, the classifiers are
trained separately for each group where the forgers belong to the group of the claimed
user.
measuring the total distance of a test utterance to the codebook normalized by the
length of the utterance. For benchmarking, a GMM-based text-independent veri-
fication system and the proposed text-dependent speaker verification in chapter 3
are implemented using the same enrollment and verification dataset. The results of
the text-dependent system (0.22% EER for the AG scenario) is superior to of the
GMM-based system (0.31% EER for the AG scenario) whereas the proposed text-
independent system yields worst results (5.79% EER for the AG scenario). Through
creating phoneme codebooks, we tried to extract discriminative speaker information
at the phoneme level;however, the results are not satisfactory. Instead of employing
deterministic models such as our approach, generation of discriminative probabilis-
tic models can yield better results. By using probabilistic models, no information
can be lost as it was in our approach where information from only certain frames
are utilized where the rest are neglected.
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CHAPTER 5
Creating Multi-biometric Templates Using Fingerprint and Voice
In this chapter, we introduce a new implementation of the multi-biometric
template framework of Yanikoglu and Kholmatov [12], using fingerprint and voice
modalities. In this framework, two biometric data are fused at the template level to
create a combined, multi-biometric template. The gain obtained through the com-
bination in the proposed scheme is three-fold: increase in template security and pri-
vacy, increase in system security and cancelability. The constructed multi-biometric
templates hide the constituent biometric data which is an important problem since
any improperly disclosed biometric data is subject to identity theft. Furthermore,
it is much less likely for the combined biometric template to reveal sensitive infor-
mation. The multi-biometric templates constructed using the proposed method are
also non-unique identifiers of the person, preventing cross-matching databases and
searching a database with latent fingerprints or other unique identifiers, raising pri-
vacy concerns [12]. The performance of the biometric system is also increased since
multiple biometrics are used in verification.
In the realization of this framework which is presented in this thesis, we use
fingerprint and voice modalities, such that the fingerprint data is hidden using a
voice pass-phrase. Fingerprint and voice are two of the most practical and commonly
accepted biometrics. Furthermore, changing the password in text-dependent voice
verification systems provides a cancelable biometric template.
The implementation of the multi-biometric template scheme provided in this
thesis thus improves on the previous implementation done using two fingerprints
by adding cancelability, as well as providing a new implementation supporting the
scheme.
5.1 Previous Work
In this section, we provide a brief summary of the previous work in the areas
of fingerprint verification as it relates to our work, and template security and privacy
work. Along with the previous chapters on voice modality, this section should
provide enough background to explain our proposed model.
5.1.1 Fingerprint Modality
Fingerprints have long been used for person verification and identification due
to their immutability and uniqueness. Minutiae-based verification approaches are
the most common, compared to ridge-based and correlation-based techniques [17].
The performance of minutiae-based fingerprint verification systems heavily depend
on the minutiae extraction process done before minutiae alignment. Minutiae ex-
traction is done using image processing operations that take advantage of the rich
information available in the ridge structure of a fingerprint. Minutiae alignment, on
the other hand, has to be done efficiently and should handle the non-linear defor-
mations present in fingerprints.
Jiang and Yau use local structure to find the correspondence between two
minutiae sets. They tested their method on a private database of 188 users and
achieved an EER under 1% [58]. Jain et al proposed an alignment based algorithm
were the ridge information is employed to align the minutiae sets and a bounding box
was proposed to match aligned minutiae [3]. Further improvements for this method
have been proposed by He et al where the EER is decreased from around 3-4% to 1-
2% in a database of 100 users [59]. Tico and Kuosmanen employed orientation field
information of the fingerprint pattern to create a fingerprint representation scheme
[34] and Ratha et al proposed a matching technique based on the graph represen-
tations of the query and template fingerprints, constructed using their respective
minutiae features [39].
5.1.2 Template Security and Privacy
Template security and privacy are main concerns in building biometric sys-
tems for numerous reasons. Protecting the biometric information against disclosure
of the biometric data itself, or other sensitive information, as well as preventing
cross-matching of databases is an active research area. Numerous architectures
have been proposed in recent years, aiming to protect biometric templates stored in
central repositories [20, 2, 37, 25]. Among those, fuzzy vault technique is one of the
most widely used method where points obtained from a biometric modality (e.g. fin-
gerprint) are stored with randomly generated chaff points [2]. A user has to provide
a certain number of minutiae points to unlock the vault created by the reference
fingerprints minutiae set given during the enrollment session. The scheme is based
on the difficulty of the polynomial reconstruction problem. There have been many
implementation of the Fuzzy Vault scheme using different biometric modalities such
as fingerprint [53, 50, 7], signature [4], as well as work showing the weaknesses of
the Fuzzy Vault scheme [6, 56].
Yanikoglu and Kholmatov proposed another method based on the idea of com-
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bining multiple biometrics in order to increase both privacy and security [12]. In the
given implementation of the general idea, minutiae points from two distinct fingers
of the same person were combined to create a multi-biometric template which is later
shown to be more unique, hence more privacy preserving. They also showed that
the system provides higher level of security as well, as it verifies both fingerprints.
In this chapter, an implementation of the multi-biometric template framework with
fingerprint and voice modalities is presented.
5.1.3 System Security
System security is another main concern in designing biometric systems beside
privacy protection. High security applications require very low error rates and uni-
modal biometric systems are not always satisfying in that regard, while multi-modal
biometric systems have proven to be useful in increasing the system security.
In literature, the combination of multiple biometrics mostly take place at
the matching score or decision level [47, 17]. Some examples of research in multi-
biometric systems are the following: Brunelli and Falavigna use the hyperbolic tan-
gent for normalization and weighted geometric average for fusion of voice and face
biometrics [44]. These modalities have also been fused by Ben-Yacoub et al by
considering several strategies such as support vector machines, tree classifiers and
multilayer perceptrons [49]. Kittler et al have experimented with fusion techniques
for face and voice on the matching score level [22]. Hong and Jain proposed an
identification system using face and fingerprint where the database is pruned via
face matching before fingerprint matching [28].
5.2 Proposed Method
For this work, we implemented the multi-biometric template framework [12]
using fingerprint and voice-modalities. Voice and fingerprint data of individuals are
fused at the template level by combining minutiae points obtained from fingerprints
with artificially constructed “minutiae“ points obtained from the utterance, as de-
scribed in the following subsections. We show that the system security is higher
compared to single biometric counterparts using only fingerprint or only voice.
5.2.1 Feature Extraction from Fingerprint
For fingerprints, minutiae points from the ridge endings and bifurcations on
the fingerprint pattern are used as features in our work. In literature, there are sev-
eral methods proposed for automatic minutiae extraction [1, 36], which commonly
follow well-known image enhancement, binarization and thinning steps. Automatic
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detection of minutiae points can sometimes result in missed or spurious minutiae.
Thus, minutiae points found through image processing operations are later verified
using various post-processing techniques [33] in some systems. After minutiae ex-
traction, finger print verification involves minutiae alignment and matching. In that
process, the challenges are caused by non-linear deformations of the fingerprint, as
well as missing and spurious minutiae.
Since the aim of this work is to build a multimodal biometric system with
information fusion at the template level, we preferred to utilize fingerprint images
with manually labeled minutiae points. This is done in order to reduce errors which
might arise from the minutiae extraction process. For template generation, the
minutiae points from users (roughly 30 minutiae points on average) are stored in
a 2-dimensional plane with their x and y coordinates as features. This process in
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: The minutiae points from fingerprints are extracted manually and stored
in a 2 dimensional plane with their x and y coordinates as features.
5.2.2 Feature Extraction from Voice
As described in previous chapters, short spectra of speech signals give infor-
mation about both the spoken words and the voice of the speaker. Therefore, we
use the Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) as the voice features. The
feature extraction process explained in 3.2.1 is summarized below for convenience.
All utterances (reference or query) are first aligned using an HMM of the spo-
ken password of the claimed identity. These pass-phrase models are formed by con-
catenating the HMMs of its constituent phonemes. They are speaker-independent
models, trained using a separate part of the database. After the alignment, frames
which correspond only to the middle state of each phoneme are kept, while the re-
maining frames (those corresponding to the 1st and 3rd states) are deleted. This
is done to use only steady-state portions of each phone, and eliminate the start
and end states that are more affected by the neighboring phones. We then calcu-
late the mean feature vector of cepstral coefficients for each phoneme. After the
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calculations, each phoneme p is represented by a 12-dimensional mean vector Fp.
Using this method, fixed-length feature vectors are extracted from varying-length
utterances consisting of the same digits. Extraction of voice features is illustrated
in Figure 5.2. The concatenation of the mean vectors of the phonemes then forms
the feature vector for the entire utterance.
Figure 5.2: Alignment with 3-stage HMMs: Previously trained 3-stage phonetic
HMMs are used in aligning an utterance, to find the correspondence between indi-
vidual frames and phonemes. Phoneme 1-N indicate the phonemes that occur in
spoken password. Levels of gray (white-gray-dark gray) indicate the 3-stages within
a phoneme.
5.2.3 Multi-biometric Template Generation
The motivation behind combining fingerprint and voice is to hide fingerprint
data along with a voice pass-phrase and store the combined multi-biometric tem-
plate. In order to hide the fingerprint data along with a voice pass-phrase, both
features need to be combined in the same feature space. Since fingerprint features
are already in the Euclidean space, we transform the voice features into the same
space to create the multi-biometric templates. First, 12-dimensional mean vectors
of each phoneme are concatenated to form a feature vector F to represent the entire
pass-phrase after the voice feature extraction process. Therefore, the F vector of an
utterance with N phonemes is N × 12 dimensional. Next, the F vector representing
an utterance is binarized using a global threshold t of -3.5 for females and -1 for
males. The binarization process is done by assigning bits to each dimension of the
F vector according to its value (if the MFC coefficient is above the threshold, 1 is
assigned to that dimension). This way, every utterance is now represented with a
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bit string B with length N ×12. The t values are determined in order to have equal
number of 1 and 0 bits for all speakers. Binarization process is illustrated in the top
two rows of Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Minutiae point generation from voice: mean feature vectors from the
previously aligned utterances are concatenated and binarized according to a prede-
termined threshold, then the bit string is divided into chunks of 8 bits to obtain the
artificial utterance points (Xi, Yi).
For using voice as a biometric, it is necessary to go through a speaker spe-
cific enrollment session. In this work, there is only one enrollment session where
10 utterances of the chosen password are collected from each user. The binary fea-
ture vectors Bi, generated from the reference utterances of a user, are combined
so as to obtain a single reference feature vector, by majority voting of the bits in
every dimension. This single feature vector represents the voice template of a single
speaker, dependent on the chosen password. This single reference feature vector is
also referred as the binary feature descriptor of the user.
Finally, to map the resulting binary voice template onto the 2-dimensional
space (the Euclidean space) of minutiae points, we followed a few different methods
with roughly similar results: in one, we divided each binary feature descriptor of
the users into groups of 16 and used each 16 bits to generate one point (X,Y) in the
Euclidean space. Of these 16 bits, 2 decimal numbers with values ranging from 0
to 255 are extracted from 8 bits each and mapped to a 2-dimensional point. The
reason for using 8 bits to represent a dimension in the Euclidean space is that all
the fingerprint minutiae data fall in a square frame of side-length 256. This way,
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when the artificially generated points from voice and fingerprint minutiae are fused
together, they cover the same region in the 2-dimensional Euclidean space.
As a second method, groups of 12 bits from the binary feature descriptors
of users are employed to create more points in the 2-D Euclidean space instead of
16. Originally, if points are created from 12 bits, they fall in a square frame with
side-length 64. This time, the points are scaled to fall inside a square frame with
a side-length of 256 to cover the same region with the fingerprint minutiae. The
process of creating artificial minutiae points is shown in the bottom row of Figure
5.3 above. The points created by grouping the bits of the binary descriptors of
the combined reference utterance or test utterances will be referred as the “voice
minutiae” of users from now on.
For this work, 6-digit pass-phrases are used. Since each digit in the English
language is composed of roughly 3 phonemes, 18 phonemes are present on average
in each pass-phrase. This means, roughly 18 12-dimensional feature vectors are ex-
tracted per utterance of a password. Thus, binary feature descriptors are composed
of 18 × 12 = 216 bits, yielding roughly 14 voice minutiae points per pass-phrase
if they are grouped by 16 bits (8 bits for 1 point). To complete the enrollment or
template generation phase, minutiae points extracted from the fingerprint (A) are
fused with the reference voice minutiae (B) of the user to form the multi-biometric
template (A+B) for the user, without any labels indicating the origin of the points.
Fusion of biometric data is illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Template level fusion of biometric data: Minutiae points from the fin-
gerprint and artificial points generated from voice are combined together in a user
template. The points are marked as to indicate the source biometric, but this infor-
mation is not stored in the database.
35
5.2.4 Verification
When a user comes for authentication, he or she is authenticated using both
the fingerprint and voice modalities, in order. First, the fingerprint minutiae (A’) are
extracted and matched against the template (A+B) of the claimed user, consisting
of both fingerprint and voice minutiae. The automatic matching is done via a simple
matching algorithm finding the best alignment over all translations and rotations,
allowing for some elastic deformation of the fingerprint (accepting two points as
matching if they are within a small threshold in this alignment). After the alignment,
the matched points are deleted from the template, leaving non-matched points in
the template, resulting in (A+B-A’). Note that ideally these are only the points
generated from the utterance of the claimed user. Matching of the test fingerprint
is illustrated in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Illustration of the first phase of the verification, where the test fingerprint
is matched with the user template shown on the left. Matched points of the template
are marked with a cross and removed in the rightmost part of the figure.
Next, the test user provides the pass-phrase of the claimed user. If the pass-
phrase is unknown, it is guessed. The F’ vector representing the test utterance is
binarized using a global threshold t and the binary feature descriptor is divided into
chunks of 16 or 12 bits to be mapped to the Euclidean space, as described in the
previous sections, resulting in the second individual template (B’).
Notice that even a genuine utterance may have a small number of bits different
from that of the binary feature descriptor used in the stored template. Hence, the
matching of the voice minutiae with the remaining points in the template (A+B-
A’) cannot take place in Euclidean space because small variations may result in
unacceptable distances, depending on the position of the erroneous bit based on
which the voice minutiae was generated. If there is an erroneous bit in the most
significant bit of the x or y coordinate, that voice minutia will be far away from
the reference voice minutia in the Euclidean space. Thus, we carry the matching
of the test voice minutiae (B’) with the remaining points in the template (A+B-
A’), in the Hamming space. This way, a small number of bit errors caused by the
variations in the user’s voice feature will cost only a few (probably 1 or 2) bits in
Hamming space. To do this, all the remaining points in the template (A+B-A’) are
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mapped back to the Hamming space by inverting the mapping of the binary feature
descriptor onto the Euclidian space. In other words, we concatenate the x and y
coordinates of a voice minutiae point, after doing a decimal-to-binary conversion, to
obtain the 12 or 16 dimensional original feature from which the voice minutiae was
extracted. To be considered a match, the Hamming distance between two bit strings
should be less than or equal to a threshold (2-bit errors are accepted in this work for
16-bit strings and 1-bit errors are accepted for 12-bit strings). Then, matched voice
minutiae points are deleted from the template (A+B-A’-B’) of the claimed identity.
Matching of the test voice minutiae is illustrated in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Illustration of the second phase of the verification where the utterance
is matched with the remaining points in the user’s template. Matched points are
removed, showing here a successful match.
5.2.5 Matching Decision
We have used two score metrics for the verification decision in this work. One
is the same with the work of Yanikoglu and Kholmatov [12] and the second is a
slight variation of it.
For the first metric, which is the Jaccard index, we consider the overlap be-
tween the remaining points and the points in the second template (voice): the person
is authenticated if a high percentage of the points involved in the second phase of
the verification (remaining points from the template and the minutiae points of the
voice) is matched.
score = Jaccard ((A+B − A′) , B′) = 2×
|(A+B − A′) ∩B′|
|(A+B − A′) +B′|
(5.1)
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In case A’ matches A perfectly and B’ matches B perfectly for this metric, the
resulting score with this metric is 1, showing a good match. If A’ was not successfully
matched, it would be reflected in the final score since many minutiae points would be
left unmatched, making the denominator large. If B’ was not successfully matched,
the numerator would be small.
As an alternative, we came up with a new score metric derived from the first
one described above. The key here is that since the number of voice minutiae to be
extracted from the test utterance is known, this information can be used to roughly
measure the independent performance of the voice matching process to increase the
overall success of the score metric. Note that we cannot measure the independent
performance of the voice matching precisely because we do not know exactly which
points on the Euclidean space are generated artificially from voice –just their count.
So the following derived score metric takes into account the fingerprint and voice
minutiae counts (A’ and B’ respectvely):
score′ =
|(A+B) ∩ A′|
|A|
+
|(A+B − A′) ∩B′|
|B|
(5.2)
Thus, we basically combine the individual performances of fingerprint and
voice matching processes. If one of these matching processes perform poorly, the
overall score decreases linearly due to the addition of matching performances.
5.3 Database
We employed the TIDIGITS database as the utterance database for this work.
The database consists of uttered digit sequences and is originally constructed for
speech recognition. The details of the database are further explained in Section
3.3. Utterances of 100 (50 men, 50 women) speakers who are randomly chosen
among 113 (56 men, 57 women) speakers are processed for multi-biometric template
creation and matching.
In order to obtain multiple sequences of the same password, as needed in a
text-dependent speaker verification, we segmented the utterances of 100 speakers
in the database into digits, using the previously described HMMs. This resulted in
16 or more utterances of the same digit by each user. Ten of each of these digits
are used for enrollment (reference feature vectors extraction followed by reference
binary feature descriptor generation) and 5 for verification (test feature vectors
extraction followed by test binary feature descriptor generation for genuine and
forgery verification tests).
To create the enrollment set, we randomly picked a 6-digit password for each
user in the database and created artificial utterances of this password by combining
segments of the constituent digits. After creating the enrollment set, genuine test
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cases were created using the unused digits of the same user (5/16+). For this
chapter, only password-known tests are conducted to simulate the scenario of a
stolen password. Therefore, forgery utterances are created using the same digit
sequence as the claimed password for the tests.
The enrollment set thus consists of a total of 1000 (10 utterances x 100 speak-
ers) reference passwords where each recorded digit is used only once. The gen-
uine test set contains 500 (5 utterances x 100 speakers) genuine passwords con-
structed from genuine, segmented digit recordings. The forgery test set contains
4900 (50x49x2 for men and women) forgery passwords constructed from segmented
digit recordings of other people. Here, each speaker forges every other speaker in
the same gender with only one utterance of the claimed password. In other words,
each speaker is forged by all the remaining speakers of the same gender who knows
his/her password.
The fingerprint database on the other hand consists of 200 fingerprints from
100 individuals (2 imprints per person). We matched each person with a randomly
chosen speaker from the utterance database, to link these two unrelated databases
and create a multi-biometric database. We then created 100 multi-biometric tem-
plates using one fingerprint of a person from the fingerprint database and the binary
feature descriptor obtained from the 10 reference feature vectors of the matching
person from the utterance database following the feature extraction processes. In
reference to the template, we will refer to these two unrelated people whose finger-
print and voice data are fused as the “user” from now on.
5.4 Results
The performance evaluation of the biometric verification system proposed in
this work is done by considering the false acceptance and false rejection rates of the
system. The verification tests are done using 3 different scenarios: In the first sce-
nario (FF), we tested the case where both the test fingerprint and the test utterance
is a forgery. Hence, we had 5 genuine tests (1 fingerprint x 5 utterances) and 49
forgeries (1 fingerprint x 49 utterances) for each user, generated by false fingerprints
and forgery utterances.
For the second scenario (FG), we tested the case where the fingerprint is a
forgery, but the utterance is genuine. This may be the situation where the forger
may have recorded a sample of the user whose voice is stored in the multi-biometric
template. Hence, the EER is calculated by comparing the results from 5 genuine
tests (1 fingerprint x 5 utterances) with 49 (49 fingerprints x 1 utterance randomly
chosen from the genuine utterances of the claimed user) forgery tests for each user,
generated by false fingerprint but genuine voice samples.
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For the last scenario (GF), we tested the case where the fingerprint is genuine,
but the utterance is forgery. This may be the situation where the forger may have
acquired a silicon fingerprint of the user whose biometric is stored in the multi-
biometric template. Hence, the EER is calculated by comparing the results from 5
genuine tests (1 fingerprint x 5 utterances) with 49 (1 fingerprint x 49 utterances)
forgery tests for each user, generated by genuine fingerprint but false utterances.
In addition to different test scenarios, further tests are conducted with different
bit string lengths for segmenting the binary feature descriptor generated from the
voice feature vectors of users. Moreover, all these tests are repeated for 2 different
score metrics. The results for this work can be seen in Table 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 for
male users and female users separately for all 3 test scenarios and score metrics.
Gender
Original Score Metric Proposed Score Metric
12-bit 16-bit 12-bit 16-bit
Male (50) 4.50% 5.15% 3.90% 0.67%
Female (50) 3.05% 4.08% 1.32% 0.87%
Average (100) 3.78% 4.62% 2.61% 0.77%
Table 5.1: Scenario 1 (FF) - The results are given for the case where both the test
fingerprint and the test utterance is a forgery for the impostor attempts.
Gender
Original Score Metric Proposed Score Metric
12-bit 16-bit 12-bit 16-bit
Male (50) 23.50% 24.20% 10.40% 6.30%
Female (50) 17.20% 21.60% 3.90% 5.90%
Average (100) 20.35% 22.90% 7.15% 6.10%
Table 5.2: Scenario 2 (FG) - The results are given for the case where the fingerprint
is a forgery, but the utterance is genuine is a forgery for the impostor attempts.
Gender
Original Score Metric Proposed Score Metric
12-bit 16-bit 12-bit 16-bit
Male (50) 10.60% 8.70% 17.20% 12.70%
Female (50) 9.90% 9.80% 15.10% 12.80%
Average (100) 10.25% 9.25% 16.25% 12.75%
Table 5.3: Scenario 3 (GF) - The results are given for the case where the fingerprint
is genuine, but the utterance is forgery.
As can be see in Table 1, in a forgery attempt with a false fingerprint and
false utterance, the equal error rate is only 0.77% for the new score metric. This
rate increases to 6.1% when the attacker has access to the utterance of the user.
Notice that the case when the attacker has access to the fingerprint of the user, the
error rate significantly increases; however, even then about 87% of the attacks are
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repelled. For this case, the EER for the original score metric is 25% lower with
respect to the EER for the proposed score metric (12.75%).
For comparison, in our work for unimodal speaker verification system as de-
scribed in Chaper 3, average EER for men and women turns out to be 0,34% with
similar voice feature extraction algorithm for the same speaker database. The av-
erage results obtained for impostors with mismatched fingerprint and voice (0.77%)
for this work are not lower than the unimodal system counter to what was expected.
Employment of trained classifiers with multiple reference vectors in the feature ex-
traction stage for the proposed unimodal text-dependent verification system yields
better results than the proposed system using multi-biometric templates.
Furthermore, we have experimented with different quantization level and dif-
ferent partitioning of the data, as well as using PCA for projecting the 6-dimensional
parts of the feature vector into 2-dimension (x,y) with similar initial results. We are
experimenting with them further to obtain more reliable 2-dimensional features from
voice. For future work, we also plan to measure how the multi-biometric template
scheme preserves privacy, by calculating recall and precision rates for retrieving tem-
plates given only one of the biometric modalities, as previously done by Yanikoglu
and Kholmatov [12].
5.5 Summary and Contributions
In this chapter, we introduced a new implementation of the multi-biometric
template framework of Yanikoglu and Kholmatov [12], using fingerprint and voice
modalities. In this framework, two biometric data are fused at the template level to
create a combined, multi-biometric template, in order to increase both security and
privacy of the system, at the same time.
In addition to the first implementation of this framework, which used two
fingerprints and showed increases in both security and privacy, the implementa-
tion presented here also provides cancelability. Cancelability of the multi-biometric
template is achieved by changing the pass-phrase uttered by the speaker, since the
generated voice minutiae depends on the pass-phrase comprised of a unique sequence
of phonemes.
Our work for unimodal speaker verification system as described in Chapter 3
yields slightly better results (0.34% EER) in comparison with the multi-biometric
method introduced here (0.77% EER), for the same speaker database. However,
the results are close and the gain in privacy may be preferred to some loss in equal
error rate of the resulting system. Employment of trained classifiers with multiple
reference vectors in the feature extraction stage for the proposed unimodal text-
dependent verification system can be listed as reasons for this outcome.
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CHAPTER 6
Contributions and Future Work
In this thesis, we present three new biometric verification systems based mainly
on voice modality. First, we propose a text-dependent (TD) system where acoustic
features are extracted from individual frames of the utterances, after they are aligned
via speaker-independent, phonetic HMMs. Second, a text-independent (TI) speaker
verification method is implemented, inspired by the feature extraction method uti-
lized for our text-dependent system. Third, we introduce a new implementation
of the multi-biometric template framework of Yanikoglu and Kholmatov [12], using
fingerprint and voice modalities.
In the TD system presented in Chapter 3, we present a new method for
text-dependent speaker verification through extraction of fixed-length feature vec-
tors from utterances. The system is faster and uses less memory as compared to
the conventional HMM-based approach, while having state-of-the-art results. In our
system, we only use a single set of speaker-independent monophone HMM models.
This set is used for alignment, whereas for the conventional HMM-based approach,
an adapted HMM set for each speaker is constructed in addition to a speaker inde-
pendent HMM set (also called universal background model in that context). This
requires much higher amount of memory as compared to the proposed approach.
In addition, during testing only a single HMM alignment is required as compared
to two HMM alignments using a universal background model and a speaker model
for the conventional approach. Thus, verification is also faster with the approach
introduced in this thesis. The results from text-dependent verification system (0.61
and 0.39% EER) may be compared to the results of Ramasubramanian et al. (under
0.1% EER) who have used the same database under similar conditions [54]. They
use multiple utterances of the same digit to create digit templates which are used in
verifying utterances of a known digit sequence. However, their EER is lower through
cohort normalization using a closed-set verification scenario. In other words, the de-
cision mechanism does not only know about the similarity of the query utterance,
but also the similarity of the forgery utterances, which significantly improves veri-
fication performance. For future studies, delta coefficients of acoustic features can
be employed to include duration information of utterances. Besides, several other
features such as LPC and their combinations can also be used to decrease the EER
of the text-dependent system. Similarly, the results by Subramanya et al [10] who
created a database suitable for text-dependent verification from the original YOHO
database may also be compared to ours. However, their results of 0.26% should be
compared to the average of “men” and “women” groups (0.34%) in our work since
“boys” and “girls” groups do not exist in the YOHO database.
In Chapter 4, we propose a text-independent speaker verification system us-
ing phoneme codebooks. These codebooks are generated by aligning the enrollment
utterances using phonetic HMMs and creating MFCC-based fixed-length feature
vectors to represent each phoneme. For verification, we define a distance metric
measuring the total distance of a test utterance to the codebook normalized by
the length of the utterance. For benchmarking, a GMM-based text-independent
verification system and the proposed text-dependent speaker verification in chap-
ter 3 are implemented using the same enrollment and verification dataset. The
results of the text-dependent system (0.22% EER for the AG scenario) is superior
to that of the GMM-based system (0.31% EER for the AG scenario), whereas the
proposed text-independent system yields worst results (5.79% EER for the AG sce-
nario). Through creating phoneme codebooks, we tried to extract discriminative
speaker information at the phoneme level; however, the results are not very satisfac-
tory. Instead of employing deterministic models such as our approach, generation
of discriminative probabilistic models may yield better results. An alternative text-
independent system in the spirit of this work can be implemented by using a generic
phone recognizing HMM as a future direction. After the phone recognizer obtains
an alignment of frames to phonemes, a fixed-length feature vector representing the
utterance can be formed. Then as in the text-dependent method, simple distance-
based algorithms can be used for person recognition.
In Chapter 5, we introduce a new implementation of the multi-biometric
template framework of Yanikoglu and Kholmatov [12], using fingerprint and voice
modalities. In this framework, two biometric data are fused at the template level to
create a combined, multi-biometric template, in order to increase both security and
privacy of the system at the same time. In addition to the first implementation of
this framework, which used two fingerprints and showed increases in both security
and privacy, the implementation presented here also provides cancelability. Cance-
lability of the multi-biometric template is achieved by changing the pass-phrase ut-
tered by the speaker, since the generated voice minutiae depends on the pass-phrase
comprised of a unique sequence of phonemes. Our work for unimodal speaker verifi-
cation system as described in Chapter 3 yields slightly better results (0.34% EER)
in comparison with the multi-biometric method introduced here (0.77% EER), for
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the same speaker database. However, the results are close and the gain in privacy
may be preferred to some loss in equal error rate of the resulting system. Employ-
ment of trained classifiers with multiple reference vectors in the feature extraction
stage for the proposed unimodal text-dependent verification system can be listed
as reasons for this outcome. Furthermore, we have experimented with different
mapping techniques, including using PCA for projecting the MFCC coefficients into
2-dimension (x,y) with similar but slightly worse results. We are experimenting
with them further to obtain more reliable 2-dimensional features from voice with
high inter-class and low intra-class variation. Through more efficient mapping meth-
ods, larger amount data from MFCC coefficients can be saved and constructing more
discriminative multi-biometric templates can be possible. For future work, we also
plan to measure how the multi-biometric template scheme preserves privacy, by cal-
culating recall and precision rates for retrieving templates given only one of the
biometric modalities, as previously done by Yanikoglu and Kholmatov [12].
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